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Tacit Agreements in the Bulgarian
Transition to Democracy: Minority Rights
and Constitutionalism
Rumyana Kolarova'
Until 1990, social scientists widely accepted that "the only
form of constitutional arrangements which socialist states have
taken seriously since 1917, are formulas for national federation
and autonomy."' The dramatic changes in Eastern Europe give
indisputable evidence that during post-totalitarian transitions,
the federative forms of constitutional arrangements are the most
vulnerable to challenges. The devolution of the socialist feder-
ative state could be described as a replacement of the dismantled
"prisonhouses of nations" by "provincial or county goals of mi-
norities."2 In former federations such as Yugoslavia, the Soviet
Union, and Czechoslovakia, the issue of minority rights was
provoked by the changes in the constitutional provisions that
regulated the governmental system/structure, sovereignty and
territory of the state.
That was not the case in Bulgaria. Introducing a national
federation, or any other kind of autonomy, was never regarded by
the communist regime as a possible solution to the problems of
the Turkish ethnic minority. On the contrary, the Bulgarian
communist regime targeted the Turkish minority for its most
recent and violent acts of repression, an approach that was quite
unusual in the context of Eastern Europe with one noticeable
exception, Romania. In both Bulgaria and Romania, the commu-
nist regimes tried to assure wider public support by promoting a
nationalistic policy and a campaign for ethnic assimilation. In
Bulgaria, post-totalitarian changes in the constitutional provi-
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Sofia University, Bulgaria.
Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780 172 (Cambridge, 1992).
2 This is a metaphor used by Ernst Gellner when analyzing the dismantling of em-
pires and the establishment of nation states within their boundaries. Ernst A. Gellner,
L'avvento del nazionalismo, e la sua interpretazione. I miti della nazione e della classe, in
Perry Anderson, ed, Storia d'Europa 24 (Einaudi, forthcoming 1994) (all citations are to
Gellner's English manuscript on file with the U Chi L Sch Roundtable).
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sions regulating human rights became the most pressing and
indispensable issue. These changes were a kind of "litmus test"
for the transition from authoritarian to democratic governance
and determined the key role that the Turkish minority's political
organization-the Movement for Rights and Freedoms
("MRF")-was to play in the process of democratization.
I. INTRODUCTION: BULGARIAN TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY
Constitutional provisions of a post-communist state can serve
a dual purpose during the process of democratization. On the one
hand, these provisions help to introduce deprived minorities into
the political process and serve as a guarantee against future
violation of minority rights. On the other hand, these provisions
also protect the incumbent elites from acts of retributive justice
initiated by potential anti-communist majorities and serve to
stabilize the entire transition against "revolutionary violence."
As a rule, in post-communist states, the public is irreconcil-
ably divided along ethnic/religious and pro-communist/anti-com-
munist lines. These two dominant cleavages seem to produce
both "dangerous minorities" and "dangerous majorities." Under
such conditions, the failure to carefully protect the rights of mi-
nority groups greatly jeopardizes the integrity of the state and
the stability of the democratization process. During periods of
peaceful transition, state authorities are unavoidably weakened.
In these circumstances, minority ethnic groups and groups com-
prised of incumbent party elites are potentially very disruptive
for two simple reasons. First, if the constitution-making process
is delayed or blocked and the rights of these two groups are not
constitutionally guaranteed, their members can be easily mobi-
lized, either for violent collective actions or for opposing change
by taking control of the coercive state apparatus. Second, if con-
stitutional guarantees for minority rights are quickly and easily
given, this may provoke the consolidation of radical nationalistic
or anti-communist majorities. Such majority power could provoke
the reemergence of the authoritarian regime.
A. Strategies for Transition to Democracy
In the Bulgarian transition to democracy, two strategies for
managing the "dangerous minorities/majorities" issue have prov-
en successful: first, gag rules combined with tacit agreements;
and second, democratic recalcitrance.
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The strategy of omission through gag rules3 and tacit agree-
ments can secure the stability of the transition to democracy. By
implementing gag rules and reaching tacit agreements with cer-
tain political actors, the majority can remove some issues of spe-
cial concern to the minority from public debate. This strategy
institutionalizes uncertainty not through bargaining on constitu-
tional and legislative texts, which introduces universal standards
and impartial rules, but through judicial review and discretion-
ary interpretation of open-ended constitutional texts. This puts
the minority in a dependent and uncertain position.
Minority "democratic recalcitrants"4 refuse to play according
to established rules, thereby seeking to discredit the moves of the
majority in- the eyes of the national and international public. For
example, the minority may resort to mass public demonstrations
to undermine the majority position rather then attempt to re-
solve an issue through parliamentary negotiations. This strategy
of questioning the legitimacy of the majority puts the majority in
an uncertain position and practically forces it to make conces-
sions to the minority in order to gain credibility. This strategy is
effective only if the majority is committed to the process of de-
mocratization and/or a system of democratic participation has
already been introduced.
B. Conditions for Transition Strategies
The strategies of gag rules and democratic recalcitrance have
been defined and discussed in texts which offer general models of
constitution-making and transitions to democracy.5 This study is
not aimed at comparative analysis and generalizations, but at
examining the specific conditions under which such strategies
have proven desirable and effective for the main political agents.
This study will evaluate two conditions under which these
strategies have been successful-impossible bargaining and un-
certainty.
' Stephen Holmes, Gag Rules or the Politics of Omission in Jon Elster and Rune
Slagstad, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy 19, 27-31 (Cambridge, 1988).
" Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:
Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies 71 (Johns Hopkins, 1986).
" See Holmes, Gag Rules at 27-31 (cited in note 3); O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transi-
tions from Authoritarian Rule at 71 (cited in note 4).
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1. Impossible bargaining.
Although the constitution-making process during the period
of transition to democracy is usually described in terms of bar-
gaining, bargaining is sometimes impossible.6 Both strategies are
in fact a kind of substitute for parliamentary bargaining. The
parties involved in the constitution-making process opt for these
strategies when communication and consensual transactions,
according to universal or impartial rules, are viewed as impossi-
ble. In such cases, it is essential that the minorities, although
stifled by the majority, are not excluded and that the issues of
conflict are articulated and at least partially resolved.
Bulgaria is an example of a constitution-making process
begun with nationalistic and communist majorities in the Parlia-
ment, both legitimized by free elections.7 The new constitution
was framed and signed without real bargaining. Even after the
second free elections,8 when the ex-communists and the na-
tionalists lost their majority in the Parliament, no genuine bar-
gaining occurred. The newly established anti-communist majority
preferred to impose decisions within Parliament, and the argu-
ments of the parliamentary minority (i.e. the deputies of the ex-
Communist Party) were barely considered. In addition, no pro-
ductive public bargaining between the coalition partners within
the governing majority ensued. Though unavoidable and relative-
ly effective in the beginning, the use of gag rules and democratic
recalcitrance gradually became unproductive.
2. Launching uncertainty.
Both strategies are effective in dealing with the ethnic mi-
norities issue only if they introduce uncertainty. This second
analytical aspect of the strategies of the major political agents in
a post-communist state is based on the definition of democracy as
"referential uncertainty." Such a framework reveals a political
system where the "outcomes of the political process are to some
extent indeterminate with regard to positions which participants
occupy in all social relations, including ... political institu-
tions."9 Yet there are different mechanisms for introducing un-
6 Jon Elster, Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction, 58 U Chi L Rev
447, 478-80 (1991).
Luan Troxel, Socialist Persistence in the Bulgarian Elections of 1990-1991, 26 E
Eur Q 407, 411-19 (1992).
8 Id at 423.
' Adam Przeworski, Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts, in Elster and
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certainty corresponding to the different patterns of transition.
The strategy of gag rules instills uncertainty in the legitimacy of
the minority and the strategy of democratic recalcitrance instills
uncertainty in the legitimacy of the majority.
General models of the process of transition from authoritari-
an rule to democracy pay special attention to the first stage of
the transition, the so-called "tutelary democracy", "limited democ-
racy", or "liberalized authoritarianism."" This liberalization is
defined as a stage at which the authoritarian regime (or incum-
bent elite) continues to maintain its power to control the political
outcomes ex post." The Bulgarian process of democratization
suggests that if there is a constitution-making process during the
liberalization stage, combining the two strategies of omission and
recalcitrance is a possible way to launch and institutionalize
uncertainty. These strategies can introduce a situation in which
irreconcilably divided political parties prefer to limit their politi-
cal tactics and goals and comply with relatively unfavorable out-
comes.
Analysts of democratic transitions tend to underestimate the
liberalization stage, arguing that no democratic constitution can
be adopted before the main political parties become bargaining
partners. 2 Bulgaria gives another perspective to the issue of
constitutional longevity, suggesting that democratic norms can be
adopted and respected not only through bargaining
(consociational transactions), but also through mutual question-
ing of each other's legitimacy. 3
The following analysis of Bulgaria's transition to democracy
follows the chronology of events during the period 1989-1992,
Slagstad, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy 59, 61 (cited in note 3).
10 The second stage is called 'real democratization." See O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transi-
tions from Authoritarian Rule at 6-14 (cited in note 4).
" A detailed definition of liberalization is as follows: 'a situation or, when it involves
a series of steps, a process of instituting civil liberties, most importantly the right of
autonomous associations, and of allowing or even creating some political organizations
through which conflicts can be processed in an open fashion, but without transforming the
power apparatus and undermining its capacity to control outcomes ex post." See
Przeworski, Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts at 61 (cited in note 9).
12 However, Przeworski argues that bargaining alone is not a sufficient condition for
the introduction of impartial rule. See Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market 79-88
(Cambridge, 1991).
13 The gag rules and tacit agreements strategy questions the legal legitimacy of the
minority. Holmes, Gag Rules at 46-47 (cited in note 3). The democratic recalcitrance
strategy questions the legitimacy of the majority in the sense of public support and
compliance with universal democratic standards. O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions
from Authoritarian Rule at 71 (cited in note 4).
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placing emphasis on the productive and unproductive uses of the
two strategies for handling their ethnic minorities issues during
two distinctive stages. This paper's analysis of the liberalization
stage extends from the beginning of the changes in the regime up
to the adoption of a new constitution (November 1989 to Summer
1991). The analysis of the democratization stage covers the peri-
od from the second free general elections up to the split in the
governing Union of Democratic Forces (UDF)/Movement for
Rights and Freedoms (MRF) parliamentary majority (October
1991 to December 1992).
II. HISTORICAL SETTING OF THE TURKISH MINORITY QUESTION
Since the establishment of a modern Bulgarian state in 1878,
the existence of a Turkish minority has traditionally been per-
ceived as a significant threat to its national integrity and sover-
eignty. This attitude was present in all of the Balkan states that
emerged after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, espe-
cially those bordering Turkey. Mass emigration of ethnic Turks
from Bulgaria and reciprocal immigration of ethnic Bulgarians
from Turkey was the routine way of establishing nation-state
boundaries. Usually, these emigration waves 4 were regulated
through agreements between the two neighboring states. Thus,
the Turkish ethnic minority problem in Bulgaria was traditional-
ly associated with foreign policy and strongly related to national
security. If the issue of minority rights was ever considered, it
was viewed in terms of a guaranteed exit option, not in terms of
Turkish minority autonomy and representation in governing
bodies.
Religious intolerance by the Bulgarian Christians towards
the Turkish Muslims increased the ethnic bias against and the
oppression of the Turks in Bulgaria. This prejudice was exacer-
bated further by the significant number of Bulgarian Muslims
," At least three mass emigrations of ethnic Turks from Bulgaria to Turkey were
regulated through agreements between the two countries. These took place during the
years 1931-41, 1947-51 and 1968-78. Through these agreements, the Bulgarian govern-
ment kept the number of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria at about 600,000. The Turkish minori-
ty population is now concentrated in two major regions of the country, the north-eastern
and south-central regions. See Anastas Totev, Naselenieto na Bulgariia 1880-1980 in 59
Godishnik na Sofiiskiia Universitet Ioridicheski Fakultet 5, 24-31 (Nauka i Iskuetvo, 1968)
(article on the population of Bulgaria from 1880 to 1980); Dimitur Filipov and Sergei
Tsvetarski, Vunshnata migratsiia na naselenieto na Bulgaria (Fondatsia Svobodna
Initsiativa, 1993); Minority Rights Group, ed, World Directory of Minorities 125 (St James,
1989).
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who inhabited the regions neighboring those inhabited by Turks.
Ethnic Bulgarians considered any protection and guarantees of
the Muslim religious rights as a precondition for the ethnic as-
similation of the Bulgarian Muslims by the Turks. 5
During the first years of the communist regime in Bulgaria
(1948-51), the cultural autonomy of the Turkish minority was
fostered through guarantees and subsidization by the state au-
thorities. 6 After this period, however, the government gradually
adopted a new policy of ethnic deprivation.'7 Turkish schools,
theaters, newspapers, and radio broadcasts first were restricted
and then closed down. By 1984, this restrictive government policy
developed into a violent ethnic assimilation campaign. 8 The
government forced Turks to change their names from Muslim to
Christian, banned the use of Turkish language outside the fami-
ly, and prohibited certain rbligious practices such as circumci-
sion. 9 Army units enforced the campaign and went so far in
several instances as to use gunfire to suppress peaceful Turkish
15 Beginning in the 14th century, a continuous history of religious and ethnic assimi-
lation of the Bulgarians by the Turks occurred. This assimilation had both voluntary and
coercive or violent elements to it. See Strashimir Dimitrov, Etnicheski i religiosni protsesi
sred bulgarskata narodnost prez XV.XVIII vek, 3 Bulgarska Etnografia 33, 33-34 (1980);
Antonina Zheliazhkova, Rasprostraneniento na isliarna v zapadnobalkanskite zemi pod
osmanska vlast XV-XVIII vek 255-62 (BAN, 1990). At least 150,000 ethnic Bulgarians are
Muslims and are concentrated in the south-central region of Bulgaria. See World Directo-
ry of Minorities at 118 (cited in note 14).
16 During this period, the government adopted a bilateral agreement with Turkey
regulating mass emigration from 1948 to 1951. In 1951, the Politburo guaranteed a high
degree of religious and cultural autonomy for the Turkish minority under its Decision A
No. 103. See Staiko Trifonov, Strogo Poveritelno, Pogled (Apr 22, 1991).
"7 This change in policy is represented by numerous unpublished acts by the Politbu-
ro. The following are representative: 1958 Theses of the Central Committee of BCP
regulating the ending of education in the Turkish language and the merging of Turkish
and Bulgarian schools; 1960 act restricting the number of religious communities from 500
to 80; 1961 act closing all Turkish schools; 1970 act eliminating the teaching of Turkish in
Bulgarian schools; and 1974 act closing down the Department of Turkish at Sofia Univer-
sity. See Staiko Trifonov, Strogo Poveritelno, Pogled (Apr 22, 1991); Staiko Trifonov,
Strogo Poveritelno, Pogled (Apr 29, 1991); Staiko Trifonov, Strogo Poveritelno, Pogled
(May 6, 1991); Staiko Trifonov, Strogo Poveritelno, Pogled (May 13, 1991); Staiko Trifonov,
Strogo Poveritelno, Pogled (May 20, 1991).
The changes in the status of the Turkish minority were codified in 1971 when a new
constitution was adopted. Until 1971, Turks were recognized as a national minority by the
Bulgarian Constitution of 1947 and were entitled to education in their vernacular lan-
guage under Article 71. See World Directory of Minorities at 125, 406 (cited in note 14).
"8 Four of the six Politburo members made the top secret decision to implement a
violent assimilation campaign. See Trifonov, Strogo Poveritelno, Pogled (May 20, 1991)
(cited in note 17); Stoian Mikhailov, Vuzroshdenskiia protses v Bulgariia 66 ("M8M",
1992).
19 World Directory of Minorities at 126 (cited in note 14).
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protests.2" During the course of the assimilation campaign, the
Turks were left without an exit option because the bilateral
agreement regulating the immigration to Turkey, signed in 1968,
had expired on November 30, 1978.21
Over time, this governmental repression consolidated the
Turkish community and caused a highly centralized and well
coordinated illegal organization to emerge. In 1984 and 1985, the
public was surprised by a series of terrorist acts, allegedly orga-
nized and committed by Turkish Bulgarians.22 During the period
from 1984 to 1989, several thousand Turks were detained by the
Bulgarian government. Approximately 1,000 of those detained
were sentenced (five of them were executed for terrorism?2 and
at least a dozen died in clashes with the police and the army.'
In May 1989, a mass protest demonstration, carried out
under the slogans of Perestroika, was held in the small town of
Kaolinovo, located in north-eastern Bulgaria.25 Within a week,
the government expelled roughly 300 suspected activists in the
illegal Turkish minority human rights movement to Austria."'
This event marked the beginning of a massive, and partially
government-enforced, emigration of the Turkish minority popula-
tion across the Bulgarian-Turkish border. Turkey had in the
meantime agreed to accept immigrants from Bulgaria. From June
through August, more than 300,000 Turks left Bulgaria. Dif-
fuse support for the government's assimilation campaign proba-
bly existed among the Bulgarian populace. Some intellectuals,
however, protested against the violence. Nevertheless, this period
of Turkish flight caused serious conflict between Bulgaria and all
the Western democracies, as well as Turkey.28
20 Id.
21 Id at 125.
' Mikhailov, Vuzrozhdenskiia protses at 66 (cited in note 18); Georgi Sotirov,
Turskite teroristi i az, edin ot shesto 32-33 (Izdatelska Kushta "IMladezh", 1991).
Sotirov, Turskite teroristi at 32-33 (cited in note 22).
World Directory of Minorities at 126 (cited in note 14).
2 Id at 127.
28 Id.
27 Id.
Id. Immediately after the collapse of the authoritarian regime of Todor Zhivkov,
over 100,000 Turks returned to Bulgaria. It is important to mention that the demographic
makeup of those returning was not the same as those Turks who left Bulgaria. When
census figures from 1985 and 1992 are compared it can be assessed that approximately
35% of those leaving, but only 10% of those returning, were below 20 years of age. See
Filipov and Tsvetarski, Vunshnata migratsiia at 11-16 (cited in note 14); Natsionalen
Statisticheski Institut ("National Statistical Institute"), Vutreshna i vunshna migratsiia
na naselenieto v krai na 90-te godini at 28-34, 90 (1992).
[1993:
Tacit Agreements in Bulgaria
In summary, directly prior to the beginning of the democrati-
zation process in Bulgaria, the Turkish minority was the most
severely deprived part of the population, yet it also had become
strongly consolidated on ethnic and religious fronts and was
easily mobilized through kinship and neighborhood networks.
Those who had suffered imprisonment and detention under the
communist regime had also become identifiable leaders. However,
Turkish minority rights activities were not motivated primarily
by any ethnic antagonism or hostility. On the contrary, they were
motivated and legitimized by their anti-communist and anti-re-
gime attitudes.
HI. FIRST STAGE-LIBERALIZATION
The liberalization stage in Bulgaria spanned the period from
the beginning of the changes in the Communist regime up to the
adoption of a new constitution, or roughly from November 1989
to Summer 1991. During this period, the strategies of gag rules
and democratic recalcitrance shaped the political debate.
A. Liberalization through Gag Rules
This section will explain the lack of public discussions and
bargaining on the issues of minority rights and
decommunization. The political parties attempted to diffuse these
issues by employing gag rules in combination with tacit agree-
ments to handle opposition to unilateral liberalization acts, to
manage the pre-constitutional negotiation process, and to control
the constitution-making process.
1. Unilateral liberalization acts.
The first unilateral liberalization act of the Communist Na-
tional Assembly, passed on December 14, 1989, abolished the
constitutional articles that banned anti-communist organiza-
tions.29 Shortly afterward, the communist-party reformers decid-
ed to recognize and publicly reject the repressive policy that had
been directed against the Turkish minority. On December 29,
1989, in accordance with a joint decision issued by the Central
Committee of the Communist Party, the Council of Ministers,
and the State Council,"0 local officials were obliged to "restore"
' Narodno Subranie, Zakon za izmenie na Nakazatelniia kodeks, Durzhaven Vestnik
No. 99 (State Gazette) 1, 1 (Dec 22, 1989) (changes in the penal code).
' Kiril Kertikov, The Ethnic Nationality Problem in Bulgaria, Bulg Q 71, 77 (Spring
32 The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable [1993:
the Muslim names of the Turkish and other Muslim minori-
ties.3' This action caused a mass protest by Bulgarians from eth-
nically-mixed regions. They called for a national referendum
on the issue of names or a moratorium on any action.33 The pro-
test was organized by local Communist Party activists who had
previously been involved in repressive actions. 4 To pacify the
protesters, the Communist National Assembly passed a special
law introducing a complicated judicial procedure through which
Bulgarian citizens with Muslim religious identity could claim
their right to an Arabic name. 5
The Assembly simultaneously passed legislation providing
amnesty to all political prisoners and compensation to all those
who had been repressed by the communist regime." As a result,
Turkish minority movement activists were released from prison,
and within four months they were able to establish and legalize
an organization called the Movement for Rights and Freedoms
(MRF).37 The MRF demanded legislative changes that would
introduce fast and simple administrative procedures for the "res-
toration" of their names. 8
1992). After the peaceful ouster of Todor Zhivkov, Secretary General of the Bulgarian
Communist Party, the typical authoritarian manner of joint decisions of the supreme par-
ty, executive and legislative authorities was preserved until the end of January 1990. At
that time, the Round Table Talks ("RTT') were vested with supreme legislative power on
a limited number of issues. Declaration on Round Table Role Status, Daily Rep E Eur 6, 6
(Mar 15, 1990).
" Narodno Subranie, Deklaratsia na Narodnoto subpanie na Harodna republika
Bulgariia po natsionalnia vupros, Durzhaven Vestnik No. 6 (State Gazette) 3, 3-5 (Jan 19,
1990) (declaration by the National Assembly).
32 Ekspress Informatsia 35/90, ed, Natsionalnia konflikt i negovotorazvitie sled
plenuma na ZK na BKP ot 29.12.1989 godina (1990); Kertikov, Bulg Q at 77 (cited in note
30).
3 The nationalist movement proposed an obligatory "name index for Bulgarian citi-
zens", identical to the French requirements for naturalization of immigrants. Ekspress
Informatsia 35/90, ed, Natsionalnia konflikt (cited in note 32); Kertikov, Bulg Q at 77
(cited in note 30).
Kertikov, Bulg Q at 77 (cited in note 30).
The legislative text was based on the presumption that from 1984 to 1985 the
Turks had voluntarily changed their names. See Narodno Subranie, Zakon za imenata na
bulgarckite grazhdani, Durzhaven Vestnik No. 20 (State Gazette) 1, 1-3 (Mar 9, 1990)
(law on the names of Bulgarian citizens).
36 See Narodno Subranie, Ukaz No. 95, Durzhaven Vestnik No. 6 (State Gazette) 1, 1-
2 (Jan 19, 1990) (National Assembly Decree No. 95).
" Kertikov, Bulg Q at 79 (cited in note 30). The group was based on the already exis-
tent illegal organizational structures. The organization was registered under the name
"Movement for Rights and Freedoms" after the court refused to register it under the name
"Movement for Rights and Freedoms of the Turks and Muslims in Bulgaria."
' Turks claimed that their names had been changed through administrative coercion.
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Once the constitutional articles banning anti-communist
organizations were eliminated, a great number of oppositional
organizations emerged. A coalition of the major opposition parties
formed the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), but the Turkish
organization, the MRF, was never admitted to the UDF as a
member. 9
2. Pre-constitutional negotiations.
Pre-constitutional negotiations between Communist Party
leaders and UDF leaders were held at the Round Table Talks( RTT).4O The MRF, however, was not admitted to participate in
these negotiations. Representatives of the Turkish minority were
courteously invited to the RTT by both the Bulgarian Communist
Party (BCP) and the UDF, but the participation of MRF as an
organization was never seriously discussed. The formal reason
given for the omission of the MRF from the Talks was that the
legal procedure for official registration of the MRF was de-
layed.4' As a practical matter, however, neither of the negotiat-
ing sides wanted to be associated with a pro-Turkish policy. They
feared being labelled as the "betrayer of the national interests"
and consequently losing public support.'
During the preliminary RTT discussions, the participants
had to set conditions under which the UDF would negotiate with
Communist Party Reformers during the Talks. One major condi-
tion set was that the ethnic-religious minority issue would not be
discussed. All participants unanimously decided that an open,
public discussion of Turkish minority rights would jeopardize the
democratization process by further consolidating and strengthen-
ing support for the emerging nationalistic parties.43
Ekspress Informatsia 35/90, Natsionalnia konflikt (cited in note 32).
' The issue was discussed, but the leaders of other human rights organizations
already included in the UDF were against it. One of the most violent opponents was
Rumen Vodenicharov, who has lately left the opposition and has openly declared his anti-
Turkish position. In January 1992, Vodenicharov ran as a candidate for vice-president
under a strongly nationalistic program.
"' The RTT were held from January to May 1990, and, according to their terms, all of
the constitutional amendments and legal acts agreed upon by a consensus at these negoti-
ations were automatically passed by the communist National Assembly. However, the
RTT acted as a sovereign legislative body only on issues concerning the forthcoming
general elections. Declaration on Round Table Role Status, Daily Rep E Eur at 6 (cited in
note 30).
4 The RTT started in January 1990, but the MRF was not registered until April of
the same year.
42 Troxel, 26 E Eur Q at 414 (cited in note 7).
41 Meanwhile, three nationalistic parties were founded: the Bulgarian National
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The participants also agreed that the culpability of the Com-
munist Party would not be an issue during the negotiations. This
agreement was necessary due to the irreconcilable positions of
the BCP and the UDF on this issue. Without a prior agreement
between the parties, the issue of BCP culpability might be used
by either side to block negotiations on other issues. Unlike the
ethnic-religious minority problem, the culpability issue was often
used by both sides to appeal to the emotions of the public during
the negotiations.
The introduction of these gag rules allowed for negotiation
between the BCP and UDF on other issues. One of the legislative
acts agreed upon at the RTT was the Bill on Political Parties
which introduced political rights, including freedom of associa-
tions, into Bulgarian society.' When the Bill on Political Parties
was ready to be finalized, the issue of the MRF's organizational
status could no longer be excluded from the agenda, and both the
BCP and the UDF found themselves in an awkward position.
Neither party wanted to discuss the issue publicly or to openly
affirm or reject the right of the Turkish minority to have an au-
tonomous political organization. At the same time, it was clear
that if this particular right was not guaranteed, most of the eth-
nic Turks would refrain from voting, and the forthcoming elec-
tions would not be recognized as free and democratic by interna-
tional observers.
After long consultations with expert groups,45 the negotiat-
ing sides agreed to discuss the Bill on Political Parties in a
closed-door RTT session.' As a result, a kind of double-standard
mechanism was worked out. An explicit ban on the formation of
parties based on ethnic or religious identity was included in the
Radical Party, the Bulgarian National Democratic Party, and the Fatherland Party of
Labor. However, perhaps due to the careful policy of the participants at the Round Table
Talks, only the third succeeded in getting one representative in the Parliament. Within a
year, the Fatherland Party of Labor formed a coalition with the Bulgarian Socialist Party
(the renamed Bulgarian Communist Party). Sofia Todorova et al, eds, Koi kakav e? 36-37
(SO "Informatsionno Obsluzhvane", 1990); Sofia Todorova, ed, Who is Who in Elections '91
63-64, 66-68, 91-97 (Information Service Co, 1991); Kertikov, Bulg Qtrly at 75 (cited in
note 30).
" Narodno Subranie, Zakon za politicheskite partii, Durzhaven Vestnik No. 29 (State
Gazette) 5, 5-7 (Apr 10, 1990) (enacted Bill on Political Parties).
" This was the non-public method of consultations at the RTT. Round Table Contact
Group Holds Sessions, Daily Rep E Eur 3, 3 (Feb 15, 1990).
46 This was a precedent because usually all RTT sessions were made public by direct
broadcast. Rumyana Kolarova and Dimitr Dimitrov, Round Table Talks in Bulgaria in
Jon Elster, ed, Round Table Talks 1, 32-33 (Chicago, forthcoming 1994) (all page number.
refer to the draft chapter on file with the U Chi L Sch Roundtable).
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legislative text.' In addition, the Supreme Court was autho-
rized to review and reject only negative decisions of the Sofia
Regional Court, the -single judicial body authorized to register
political parties." Because the judicial procedure created by the
new bill was highly centralized and thereby easily controlled by
the Communist Party/state authorities, the top party officials
essentially had the power to decide whether and how the MRF
would be registered. Nonetheless, the MRF was recognized as an
autonomous political organization and was allowed to participate
in the elections for a parliament, which also would act as the
Constituent Assembly.49 The MRF was legally recognized not
through a constitutional amendment, but by a tacit agreement
negotiated at the RTT and legalized by the judiciary.
3. Gag rules and the constitution-making process.
The major political parties continued to judiciously employ
the gag rules strategy during the constitution-making process to
contain the potentially explosive issues of Communist Party cul-
pability and ethnic minorities' rights. The task of drafting a new,
democratic constitution fell to the newly elected Parliament,
which thus served as the Constituent Assembly.
The political divisions within the Parliament perpetuated the
need for the gag rules strategy. The distribution of seats in the
Constituent Assembly reproduced the dominant position of the
renamed Communist Party, the Bulgarian Socialist Party"
(BSP), which held 216 out of 400 seats and could control the
legislative and executive acts51 of the Assembly. The UDF with
" Law on Political Parties, Art 3 §2(3). Narodno Subranie, Zakon za politicheskite
partii, Durzhaven Vestnik No. 29 (State Gazette) at 5 (cited in note 44).
48 Law on Political Parties, Art 9. Narodno Subranie, Zakon za politicheskite partii,
Durzhaven Vestnik No. 29 (State Gazette) at 5 (cited in note 44).
"' The elections were held on June 10 and 17, 1990. Troxel, 26 E Eur Q at 408 (cited
in note 7). The Assembly was elected to draft a new constitution. Narodno Subranie,
Zakon za izmenenie i dopulnenie na Konstitutsiiata na Narodna repoblika Bulgariia,
Durzhaven Vestnik No. 29 (State Gazette) 1, 5 (Apr 10, 1990) (Law on the Amendment of
the Constitution, §50).
' During the election campaign, the Communist Party changed its name to the
Bulgarian Socialist Party. Todorova, ed, Who is Who in Elections '91 at 94 (cited in note
43). It seemed that one of the main results of the liberalization policy legitimized by the
RTT was that the communists, like the Turks, were given the freedom to rename them-
selves whenever and however they wished.
"' The Constituent Assembly had sovereign power to pronounce on executive and
even judicial acts. During the period when there was a BSP cabinet, the BSP deputies
included a wide range of issues on the agenda of the Constituent Assembly, even issues
like the contaminated water of a high mountain dam lake. The BSP was obviously aiming
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its 145 seats had veto power only on constitution-making, be-
cause a two-thirds majority was required for the approval of
constitutional texts.52 The MRF, although represented in the
Constituent Assembly as the third largest parliamentary group
with 23 seats, could not influence any legislation, including the
constitutional texts.
In order to continue the process of liberalization and begin
the next stage of democratization, both the BSP and the UDF
had to make mutual concessions. Nevertheless, one issue contin-
ued to arise that the BSP was completely unwilling to discuss:
communist party culpability and the responsibility of party mem-
bers for the repressions carried out by the communist regime.5"
Predictably, the BSP and the UDF were irreconcilably divided on
this issue. The BSP deputies radically opposed assignment of
culpability and blocked all attempts by the UDF to include the
issue on the agenda of the discussions.
Turkish minority rights became the second issue decided
upon by the Constituent Assembly without public bargains and
compromises. In the beginning of the parliamentary discussions,
the BSP agreed to liberalize the procedure for the restoration of
Muslim names. In October 1990, a law introducing a simple ad-
ministrative procedure for restoring Muslim names was passed.
Mass protests by the Bulgarian population in the regions pre-
dominantly inhabited by Turks immediately followed the enact-
at shared responsibility for executive decisions. See, for example, Veliko Narodno
Subranie, Reshenie za podobriavazhe na ekologichnata obstazhovka okolo iazvir
"Tonolizhitsa", Durzhaven Vestnik No. 66 (State Gazette) 2, 2-3 (Aug 17, 1990) (decision
of National Assembly referring to contaminated waters); Veliko Narodno Subranie,
Reshenie za promeni v sustava na Burkhovniia sud na Narodna republika Bulgariia,
Durzhaven Vestnik No. 94 (State Gazette) 3, 3 (Nov 23, 1990) (decision of National
Assembly giving the Assembly the power to elect and dismiss judges to the Supreme
Court); Veliko Narodno Subranie, Reshenie za izbirone glaven prokuror na Narodna
republika Bulgariia, Durzhaven Vestnik No. 90 (State Gazette) 2, 2 (Nov 9, 1990) (deci-
sion of National Assembly giving the Assembly the power to appoint attorney general);
Veliko Narodno Subranie, Reshenie za osvobozhdavane ot dluzhnost i izbirone na sudni u
roionni, okruzhni i voenni sudilishta, Durzhaven Vestnik No. 79 (State Gazette) 1, 1-3
(Oct 2, 1990) (decision of National Assembly giving it the power to appoint justices for
local, regional and military courts).
5 Bulg Const, Art 143(3) in Durzhaven Vestnik No. 39 (State Gazette) 1, 10 (May 18,
1971).
' Since January 1990, the strategy of the BSP was to limit and personalize this issue
as much as possible. However, under constant public pressure the party reformers started
several show trials against top party leaders-the former communist leader Todor
Zhivkov and his closest collaborators. In general, the judicial procedure was very slow and
ineffective. The investigation started in 1990 and the trial did not begin until February
25, 1991.
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ment of this procedure.' This time nationalistic actions were
stifled by a simultaneous wave of anti-communist mass protests
and strikes.55 However, the BSP deputies became aware that
public bargaining and concessions on the issue of Turkish minori-
ty rights would greatly erode the support of their electorate.
Hence, they decided to introduce gag rules on the issue.
Because the issue of ethnic-religious minority rights could
not be omitted, it was "privatized."" For example, the term "mi-
nority" was not used in any constitutional text. Constitutional
provisions guaranteed the cultural autonomy of all Bulgarian
citizens," but reproduced the ban on political parties organized
along any ethnic and religious lines.8
Regardless of the earlier concession on the restoration of
Muslim names, the policy of consciously restricting MRF access
to power was strictly followed by the BSP. As part of the process
of liberalizing political participation, the government was to ap-
point new temporary local councils within three months, begin-
ning in December 1990, with seats in the councils distributed in
proportion to the number of votes won by each party in the gen-
eral elections. This procedure was carefully controlled and de-
layed so that in the regions with predominantly Turkish popula-
tions, MRF representatives were effectively prevented from enter-
ing the local administrations.
When UDF deputies could no longer accept and obey gag
rules on the issue of Communist Party culpability, they opted for
the strategy of "democratic recalcitrants." In the beginning, they
refused to participate in the plenary sessions of the Assembly,
and later refused to sign the new constitution.59 Initially, this
recalcitrance was an unanimous decision, but later the UDF
Kertikov, Bulg Q at 77 (cited in note 30). These protests were initiated and orga-
nized by BSP local activists and encouraged by the local administrations.
This was closely related to the unwillingness of the BSP to include the issue of
Communist party culpability on the agenda. Politicheska deklaratsiia na parlamentarniia
suiuz na demokratichnite sili, Demokratsiia 1, 1, 4 (Oct 26, 1990) (declaration of UDF
deputies); Deklaratsia na KS na SDS, Demokratiia 1, 1 (Nov 21, 1990) (declaration of
UDF deputies).
See Holmes, Gag Rules at 24 (cited in note 3).
'7 Bulg Const, Art 36(2), 37(1) and 54(1) (Sofia Press Agency, 1991).
As later interpreted by the Constitutional Court, this meant that parties claiming
to represent the interests of only Christians or of only Bulgarians should also be banned.
Konstitutsionen Sud, Reshenie No. 4 ot 21 april 1992 g. no konstitutsionno delo No. 1 ot
1991 g., Durzhaven Vestnik No. 35 (State Gazette) 1, 1-8 (Apr 28, 1992) (Decision No. 4 of
the Constitutional Court).
"' Politicheska deklaratsiia, Demokratsiia at 1 (cited in note 55); Deklaratsia na KS
na SDS, Demokratiia at 1 (cited in note 55).
38 The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable
parliamentary group split on that issue.6"
The MRF deputies in the Assembly, elected as representa-
tives of the Turkish minority, also refused to sign the new consti-
tution, thus opting for the strategy of "democratic recalcitrants"
already legitimized by the UDF deputies.61 Both parties reacted
to the gag rules imposed by nationalistic and pro-communist
majorities by focusing public attention on the "gagged" issues.
This made the strategy of the BSP at least partially unproduc-
tive.
B. The Role of Democratic Recalcitrance
In order to understand the strategy of democratic recalci-
trance, it is essential to distinguish it from spontaneous mass
protest. Democratic recalcitrance in Bulgaria manifested as the
strategy of a negotiating partner who refuses to accept the terms
offered by the authoritarian rulers, seeking to discredit them
nationally as well as internationally. The UDF and MRF repre-
sentatives could follow this policy only after they were accepted
as negotiating partners or elected in the Constituent Assembly.
1. Democratic recalciltrance during the pre-constitutional
negotiations.
During the RTT, the UDF representatives successfully used
this strategy of democratic recalcitrance. Reacting to the unwill-
ingness of the BSP to make concessions, they twice left the nego-
tiations and called for mass protest.62 In both cases the points of
disagreement between the parties were not directly related to
either the issue of communist culpability or minority rights be-
cause the UDF had accepted the gag rules proposed by the BSP
on these issues during this pre-constitutional negotiations phase.
As noted above, the UDF became unwilling to accept such gag
rules during the constitution-making process. Not being invited
to the RTT and thus not recognized as leaders of an organization
legitimately representing the Turkish minority, the MRF activ-
The split started during the national conferences of the TDF in April and May of
1991 and became unavoidable after the signing of the new Constitution. The UDF split
into three parties: the UDF, the UDF-Liberals and the UDF-Center. All three parties
participanted in the general elections held in October 1991. Todorova, ed, Who is Who in
Elections '91 at 24, 50, 54 (cited in note 43).
6 Georgi Stoianov, DPS napusna zalata, Demokratsiia 1, 1-2 (Jun 8, 1991) (MRF
deputies refuse to sign constitution).
62 Round Table Negotiations Going Slowly, Daily Rep E Eur 7, 7 (Feb 8, 1990).
[1993:
Tacit Agreements in Bulgaria
ists were not in a position to play democratic recalcitrants during
this period.
2. Democratic recalcitrance during the constitution-making
process.
Both the UDF and the MRF were in a better position to use
the democratic recalcitrance strategy during the constitution-
making process. The election of their deputies to Parliament
bolstered their legitimacy. In addition, the BSP lacked the requi-
site two-thirds majority to adopt the consitution and thus, was
forced to make concessions to the UDF and MRF in order to get
the constitution adopted.
When the results of the general elections were announced,
the UDF supporters reacted with massive protests.' As the only
legitimate anti-communist coalition, the UDF had a virtual mo-
nopoly on public protest and could easily use it as an efficient
means for imposing change. In fact, as a result of mass street
protests following the first elections, the BSP was forced to share
presidential power with the UDF."
The first attempt of the UDF to be recalcitrants in the Con-
stituent Assembly was in December 1990, when all of its depu-
ties left the parliament to protest against both the election of the
cabinet by the BSP majority and the "gagging" of the issue of
party culpability and retributive legislation.65 Mass public pro-
tests backed this move of the UDF deputies. Sofia, the capital of
' The UDF made accusations that the BSP was guilty of manipulations and forgeries
during the elections. Deklaratsiia na suiuza na demokratichnite sili, Demokratsiia 1, 1
(Jun 14, 1990) (declaration by UDF deputies); Alexander Iordanov, Izborniiat Urok,
Demokratsiia (Jun 14, 1990); Purvo faktite-posle doverieto, razgovor s d-r Zheliu Zhelev,
Demokratsiia 1, 1 (Jun 25, 1990) (interview with Zheliu Zhelev).
I As part of the RTT agreements, a presidential institution with limited powers was
introduced and Petar Mladenov, a well known Communist Party reformer was elected
president by the old regime parliament. After the general elections, as a result of a
raising wave of mass protest, Mladenov resigned. Veliko Narodno Subranie, Reshenie,
Durzhaven Vestnik No. 62 (State Gazette) 1, 1 (Aug 3, 1990) (announcing Mladenov's
resignation). After five unsuccessful attempts to elect a replacement for Mladenov, the
leader of the UDF, Zheliu Zhelev, was elected president by the Constituent Assembly as
part of a deal between the BSP and the UDF. Veliko Narodno Subranie, Reshenie,
Durzhaven Vestnik No. 63 (State Gazette) 1, 1 (Aug 7, 1990) (announcing Zhelev's elec-
tion). As part of the same deal and on the same day, General Atanas Semerdjiev, ex-Army
Chief of Staff and ex-Minister of Interior, was elected vice-president.
' The BSP majority blocked the attempts of the UDF to include in the parliamentary
agenda the issue of confiscating Communist Party property. Politicheska deklaratsiia,
Demokratsiia at 1 (cited in note 55); Deklaratsia na KS na SDS, Demokratiia at 1 (cited
in note 55).
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Bulgaria, was paralyzed by political strikes calling for the resig-
nation of the newly-formed cabinet.6
The legitimacy of the BSP as a dominant democratizing
agent was extremely vulnerable to mass protest appeals for sev-
eral reasons. First, because it was the former Communist Party,
the BSP had trouble distancing itself from its antidemocratic
record. Second, the BSP could not derive complete legitimacy
from the elections because the elections were hastily called and
the opposition lacked sufficient time, resources and organization
to campaign effectively. In addition, the elections only gave the
BSP a narrow majority in Parliament. Thus, although it had a
parliamentary majority, the BSP was forced to create a coalition
cabinet including all parliamentary forces, except the MRF, and
to sign an agreement setting a timeframe for the constitution-
making process. 7 After appeasing the mass protest movement,
the BSP majority, supported by some of the UDF deputies, de-
clared their intent to discuss the constitution drafts for at least
another year and thus delay the elections.
In May, 39 UDF deputies, proponents of the non-cooperative
strategy towards the BSP, left the parliament calling for immedi-
ate general and local elections." Some of them even declared a
hunger strike.69 This was a clear case of democratic recalci-
trance. The socialist party quickly reacted by starting an acceler-
ated procedure for passing the constitutional text into law.
As constitutional framers, the BSP deputies were very sensi-
tive to any public criticism because of their weak legitimacy as
democratic agents. They attempted to match the liberal-demo-
cratic criteria as much as possible. Even when dealing with eth-
nic minority rights, the BSP tried to abide by internationally-
accepted standards. As a result, the Assembly recognized the
right of members of non-Bulgar ethnic groups to study their
" Stachno reshenie na knofederatsiiata na gruda "Podkrepa," Demokratsiia 1, 1 (Nov
26, 1990) (declaration by Podkrepa). The BSP Prime Minister resigned as a result of these
mass protests. Troxel, 26 E Eur Q at 416-19 (cited in note 7).
' All parties represented in the parliament agreed to prepare and vote upon the new
constitution within a five-month period running from January to May 1991. They also
agreed to schedule general elections in June 1991. The agreement was not passed as a
decision of the Constituent Assembly and the deputies could overstep it. Sporazumenie
mezhdu politicheskite sili, predstaveni vuv velikoto narodno subronie, za garantirane na
murniia prekhod kum demokratichno obshtestvo, Demokratsiia 3, 3 (Jan 5, 1991).
" Georgi Koritarov, 39 denutati ot SDS hapusnakha zalata, Demokratsiia 1, 1-2
(May 15, 1991).
" UDF MPs on Hunger Strike in Protest at [sic] New Constitution; Rally Supports
Them, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Jul 16, 1991).
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mother tongue, albeit after long and wearying discussions.70
Nevertheless, the constitutional draft virtually reproduced the
text of the RTT "Bill on Parties," despite the protestations of the
MRF deputies. The constitutional text explicitly banned parties
along ethnic, racial or religious lines.7' The MRF deputies tried
to negotiate and bargain on this issue, but after the UDF walk-
out, none of the remaining politicians in the parliament consid-
ered the MRF's arguments seriously.
Anticipating retributive actions by the anti-communist par-
liamentary majority, which was expected to be in place after the
second elections, the BSP majority drafted the constitutional text
to provide the strongest possible guarantees for individual hu-
man rights and vested the Constitutional court with relatively
strong powers to review legislative acts passed by the parlia-
ment. Within two months, the constitutional draft was discussed,
voted on three times, and finally signed by the required two-
thirds majority of the Constituent Assembly on July 12, 1991.72
The UDF parliamentary group split over the new Constitu-
tion. At least 60 of the deputies, following the democratic recalci-
trance strategy, refused to sign the new Constitution and claimed
that it was not legitimate.73 The MRF parliamentary group also
split over the Constitution. More than half of the Turkish mi-
nority representatives74 refused to sign it because the text in-
cluded articles banning political parties along ethnic and reli-
" Bulg Const, Art 36 (2) states: "Citizens whose mother tongue is not Bulgarian shall
have the right to study and use their own language alongside the compulsory study of the
Bulgarian language."
11 Bulg Const, Art 11(4) declares: "There shall be no political parties on ethnic, racial
or religious lines, nor parties which seek the violent usurpation of the state power."
72 The New Constitution is Adopted, Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (BTA) Daily News
2, 2 (Jul 12, 1991).
" The UDF Ministers in the coalition government were among the 60 MPs who did
not sign the constitution. The President refused to sign the new constitution as well, but
this was a symbolic act as he had no veto power. 309 deputati se podpisakha pod novata
konstitutsiia parlamentut pia "mila rodino" i pi shampansko, Duma 1, 1-2 (Jul 13, 1991);
Mitko Bozhkov, Iuridicheskiiat gaf e na Georgi Markov, a ne na parlamenta, Duma 1, 1-2
(Jul 16, 1991); Bulg Const, Transitional and Concluding Provisions, cl 9.
"' Though only ethnic Turks voted for the MRF candidates in the elections for the
Constituent Assembly, the MRF leaders were very cautious not to be accused of being an
organization based along ethnic and religious lines and thus not allowed to participate in
the elections. To avoid this, they included a significant number of ethnic Bulgarians in
their party lists. As a result, at least one third of the MRF deputies in the Assembly were
ethnic Bulgarian and Christian. All of these deputies signed the Constitution and were
afterwards expelled from the RF and replaced by other Christian Bulgarians. The New
Constitution is Adopted, BTA Daily News at 2 (cited in note 72); Stoianov, DPS napusna
zalata, Demokratsiia at 1 (cited in note 61).
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gious lines.75 Shortly thereafter, 93 BSP deputies lodged a com-
plaint in the Constitutional Court asking that the MRF be de-
clared an unconstitutional organization.7"
The first stage of the process of integrating the Turkish mi-
nority into Bulgarian politics was dominated and controlled by
the BSP, the former Communist Party. The BSP promoted a
nationalistic policy through its majority in the parliament that
"gagged" the issue of ethnic-religious rights and through its local
activists who, as a rule, organized the nationalist anti-Turkish
protests in the regions inhabited predominantly by ethnic Turks.
However, the UDF's strategy of democratic recalcitrance limited
the BSP's range of action. As a result, the BSP majority in the
Constituent Assembly gave enough guarantees of their willing-
ness to frame a relatively democratic constitution that one faction
of UDF deputies decided to accept the gag rules imposed by the
majority. These UDF deputies limited the scope of their political
agenda in order to make further democratization possible, and
focused on more general issues-separation of powers and basic
human rights. The remaining portion of the UDF deputies reject-
ed concessions, continued to follow the democratic recalcitrance
strategy, and refused to bargain under the condition of BSP dom-
ination. In fact, the non-cooperative UDF deputies questioned the
productivity of the gag rules imposed on the issue of retribution
and strengthened the pro-communist/anti-communist cleavage.
At the end of the liberalization stage, the MRF, although
legalized through a complicated procedure, had equal status with
the other political parties. It had enough freedom to develop an
effective organizational structure. The MRF could rely on the
firm support of ethnic Turks, who almost unanimously voted for
the MRF. Nevertheless, the Turkish minority activists were
forced to refrain from public affirmation of their ethnic and reli-
gious identity. When nominating candidates for general elections
and building its organizational structure, the MRF invited ethnic
Bulgarians to speak publicly for them.
The most important accomplishment achieved by the gag
rules was the avoidance of a radical public confrontation on eth-
nic-religious issues. These rules averted the dangerous
ethnification" of the political process that blocked the democra-
Bulg Const, Art 11(4).
" Konstitutsionen Sud, Reshenie No. 4, Durzhaven Vestnik No. 35 (State Gazette) at
1 (cited in note 58).
" Ethnification is the differentiation of the status rights of acting political parties ac-
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tization process in Yugoslavia and in some of the former Soviet
republics. In addition, the text of the new Constitution gave at
least some protection against future cultural and religious dis-
crimination of the Turkish minority.
IV. SECOND STAGE: DEMOCRATIZATION
The new Constitution adopted by the Constituent Assembly
introduced the separation of powers between the Parliament, the
President, the Government, the Constitutional Court and the
Judiciary. 8 On October 12, 1991, less than three months after
the adoption of the Constitution, the voters elected the President,
members of Parliament, and local officials in general and local
elections.79 The Constitutional Court was also elected in Octo-
ber. o In November, the new cabinet was elected, followed by the
direct presidential elections in January 1992.81
The results of the general elections were quite unexpected.
Only three parties entered the parliament-the non-cooperative
splinter group of the UDF (110 seats), the BSP (106 seats), and
the MRF (24 seats).82 These elections gave a clear parliamentary
majority to the non-cooperative anti-communist parties, the UDF
and the MRF. At the same time, the narrow parliamentary ma-
jority of the UDF and the MRF guaranteed veto power to the
BSP on constitutional amendments. The local elections showed
cording to the ethnic affiliations of their supporters. See Claus Offe, Strong Causes, Weak
Cures, E Eur Const Rev 21, 21-23 (Spring 1992); Capitalism by Democratic Design? Demo-
cratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe, 58 Social Research 865,
876 (1991).
78 Bulg Const, Ch 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8.
Troxel, 26 E Eur Q at 419-25 (cited in note 7).
Burkhoven Sud, Reshenie No. 2 ot 18 septemvri 1991 g., Durzhaven Vestnik No. 81
(State Gazette) 12, 12-13 (Oct 2, 1991) (Decision No. 2 of the Supreme Court nominating
judges to the Constitutional Court); Veliko Narodno Subranie, Reshenie za izbirane
chlenove na Konstitutsionniiia sud, Durzhaven Vestnik No. 82 (State Gazette) 7, 7 (Oct 4,
1991) (decision of the National Assembly nominating judges to the Constitutional Court);
Prezident na Republikata, Ukaz No. 299, Durzhaven Vestnik No. 82 (State Gazette) 8, 8
(Oct 4, 1991) (presidential decree nominating judges to the Constitutional Court).
", Bulg Const, Final and Concluding Provisions, c 7(2); Veliko Naordno Subranie,
Zakon za izburane na prezident i vitseprezident na republikata, Durzhaven Vestnik No. 82
(State Gazette) 1, 1-2 (Oct 4, 1991) (law on the election of President and Vice President);
Veliko Naordno Subranie, Zakon za izmenenie i dopulnenie na Zakona za izburane na
prezident i vitseprezident na republikata, Durzhaven Vestnik No. 98 (State Gazette) 1, 1-3
(Nov 28, 1991) (law amending the law on the election of President and Vice President).
' The cooperative oppositional parties, who signed the constitution and split off from
the UDF, could not pass the four percent threshold because of their irrational policy of
running separately or forming small coalitions. See Troxel, 26 E Eur Q at 423 (cited in
note 7) (statement of the Central Electoral Committee on Nov 1991).
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that while the BSP had lost its dominant position in more than
half of the local councils, the MRF had gained a majority in only
28 out of 255 local administrative bodies. Under these conditions
no political party could control the outcome of the political pro-
cess ex post.
A. Gag Rules in the Context of Separation of Powers
The cabinet was elected by the new parliamentary majority
of the UDF and the MRF. This was a very peculiar coalition
government. The cooperation between these coalition partners
was never regulated through any agreements and was based
predominantly on their radical anti-communist attitudes and on
the uncertain status of the MRF. 3 All BSP attempts to influ-
ence the legislative process were unanimously rejected by the
UDF and MRF deputies. Virtually no bargaining in the parlia-
mentary discussions occurred, neither with the BSP, nor between
the UDF and the MRF. The coalition partners usually agreed
about their mutual concessions before the discussions and were
unwilling to consider the BSP position.
Initially, the strategies of the UDF and MRF did not overlap
or conflict. The main concerns of the MRF were the issues of the
constitutionality of its existence as a political party and the legis-
lative and administrative regulation of Turkish minority rights
recognized in the new constitution.' The main concern of the
UDF was economic reform and the so-called "decommunization
laws".8
5
Regardless of their non-cooperative parliamentary policy
toward the BSP, both the UDF and the MRF were quite cautious
about the anti-Turkish attitudes of the majority of the public.
Gag rules on the issue of Turkish minority rights were strictly
followed. By mutual agreement, there were no MRF Ministers or
Vice-Ministers in the UDF cabinet. The right to study Turkish
language at schools was institutionalized by a two stage proce-
dure similar to the one followed by the BCP when restoring the
Arabic names of the Muslims. It was delayed initially until Sep-
tember 1991 through a moratorium passed by the Constituent
' The Constitutional Court waited to decide the issue of the MRF's constitutionality
until April 1992. Konstitutsionen Sud, Reshenie No. 4, Durzhaven Vestnik No. 35 (State
Gazette) at 1-8 (1992 decision in which the Constitutional Court interpreted the con-
stitutional ban on ethnic-based parties) (cited in note 58).
' Todorova, ed, Who is Who in Elections '91 at 74-76 (cited in note 43).
8 Id at 24-49.
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Assembly," and later pushed backed until March 1992 by an
executive decree of the Council of Ministers issued on November
29, 1991.87 The decree immediately provoked mass protests by
the Bulgarians in regions with mixed populations." To appease
the protestors, the procedure instituting ethnic minority rights
was delayed first by the Ministry of Education, and then by a
moratorium passed by the parliament. It was not until March
1992 that classes in the Turkish language were finally introduced
in state schools.
During the presidential elections, the vulnerability of UDF
cooperation with the MRF to the BSP policy of exploiting nation-
alistic feelings and xenophobic fears of the Bulgarian population
became obvious. Due to an active nationalistic campaign,"
Velko Valkanov, the BSP supported candidate, got 47.3 percent of
the votes in the second round run off election, while Zhelyu
Zhelev, the UDF and MRF supported candidate and president
elect, got 52.7 percent of the votes.0
Gag rules on the issue of Turkish minority rights were
steadily legalized and institutionalized in Bulgarian politics.
Another example of the gag rules strategy on the issue of Turk-
ish minority rights was the decision of the Constitutional Court
regarding the MRF's constitutional status. Beyond doubt, the
members of the Court were affiliated with the two major political
actors in Bulgaria, the BSP and the UDF. The final decision by
the Court was delayed several times. However, the decision nar-
rowly upholding the MRF's status finally was announced on April
20, 1992. This action was due to the pressure of the May 5th
acceptance of Bulgaria into the Council of Europe." European
' The UJDF and the MRF controlled the required parliamentary majority to pass
such an act, but they were constrained by fear of public reaction. Velikonarodno Subranie,
Ukaz No. 98, Durzhaven Vestnik No. 22 (State Gazette) 1, 1 (Mar 19, 1991) (Decree No.
98 of the Constituent Assembly).
' Ministerski Suvet, Postanovlenie No. 232 ot 29 Noemvri 1991 g. za izuchavane na
maichin ezik v obshtinskite uchilishta, Durzhaven Vestnik No. 102 (State Gazette) 1, 1
(Dec 10, 1991) (Council of Minister's Decision No. 232).
' Again, the BSP local party activists initiated and organized these protests and the
BSP representatives in the local administrations encouraged these protests.
' In a public dispute between the two rounds of the elections, Velko Valkanov ac-
cused Zheliu Zhelev of being a Turk. On the first round, Zhelev received 47.2 percent of
the vote against the 30.8 percent of the vote that Valkanov received. Prezidentski Izbori,
Biuletin 6-7 (Jan 12-19, 1992). The increase in the votes for Velko Valkanov was quite ob-
vious in the regions comprised of both Turkish and Bulgarian ethnic groups. Id at 177-97,
519-77.
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" Bulgariia se zavurna v lonoto na evropeiskoto semeistvo, Demokratsiia 1, 1 (May 6,
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officials had made it clear that if the MRF was declared unconsti-
tutional, Bulgaria would not meet the requirements for admis-
sion to the European Council.92 The Constitutional Court, while
affirming the MRF's constitutionality, did so in the narrowest
possible way, leaving open the possibility of future challenges to
the legitimacy of the Turkish-based organization." It is signifi-
cant that the claim that the MRF was unconstitutional was re-
jected by the veto power of the five pro-UDF justices.94 Under
the Bulgarian Constitution, rulings by the Constitutional Court
require a majority of more than half the justices in order to be-
come effective.95 Thus, anything that the Court fails to declare
unconstitutional is considered to be constitutional. Clearly, the
Constitutional Court justices were radically divided and unwill-
ing or unable to make a positive decision on the issue.
B. Strategy of Democratic Recalcitrance
The issues of party culpability and retributive legislation
were priorities on the UDF agenda. Elected with a program that
included plans for retributive legislation and radical anti-commu-
nist slogans, once in office the UDF and MRF deputies quickly
passed a law for confiscation of Communist party property 6 and
inserted provisions in crucial laws (e.g. the law on banking law
and the law on pensions) that discriminated against former Com-
munist Party leaders.97 Simultaneously, retributive judicial pro-
1992) (discussing Bulgaria's admission to the Council of Europe).
Id at 7.
" Kjell Engelbrekt, Bulgaria, 1 RFE/RL Research Report: Toward the Rule of Law 4,
6 (Jul 3, 1992).
' See Turkish Party in Bulgaria Allowed to Continue, E Eur Const Rev 11, 11
(Summer 1992); Engelbrekt, 1 RFERL Research Report: Toward the Rule of Law at 6
(cited in note 93).
9' Bulg Const, Art 151(1).
Narodno Subranie, Zakon za imushtestvoto na Bulgarskata komunistichska partiia,
Bulgarskiia zemedelski naroden suiuz, Otechestveniia front, Dimitrovskiia komunisticheski
mladezhki suiuz, Suiuza na aktuvhite bortsi protiv fashizma i kapitalizma i Bulgarskite
profesionalni suizi, Durzhaven Vestnik No. 105 (State Gazette) 1, 1-2 (Dec 19, 1991) (law
on the confiscation of property owned by the Bulgarian Communist Party and affiliated
organizations). The bill also provided for the confiscation of the property of all organiza-
tions existent under and affiliated with the old regime-Communist Youth Union, Father-
land Front, Trade Union, Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, etc.
"' Narodno Subranie, Zakon za bankite i kreditnoto delo, Durzhaven Vestnik No. 25
(State Gazette) 1, 1-8 (Mar 27, 1992) (law on banking and lending); Narodno Subranie,
Zakon za izmenenie i dopulnenie na Zakona za penciite, §6, Durzhaven Vestnik No. 52
(State Gazette) 1, 1 (Jun 26, 1992) (§6 of this law amends the pension law by introducing
a new article, Article 10a, which calls for the confiscation of property of the Communist
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cedures were accelerated, and the anti-communist parliamentary
majority voted for the lifting of former BSP Prime Minister An-
dre Lukanov's parliamentary immunity and issuing a warrant for
his arrest." The BSP reacted by appealing all retributive parlia-
mentary acts to the Constitutional Court, by leaving plenary
sessions, and by calling for mass protests.99 The walk-outs and
mass protests were the BSP's attempts to play democratic
recalcitrants, but they lacked credibility. Though a considerable
number of BSP supporters were mobilized to protest, the general
public assessed this as partisan activity.
The Constitutional Court confirmed the constitutionality of
the law on the confiscation of Communist Party property and the
decisions concerning Lukanov's immunity, but overruled those
parts of banking law and pensions law that violated individual
human rights of former communist leaders. 1'0 The Court deter-
mined that those portions of the banking and pensions laws con-
tradicted the constitution and the European Convention of Hu-
man Rights, which Bulgaria had signed and ratified. Thus, the
Constitutional Court was the body which provided an impartial
solution on the issue of retribution. The Court's decisions also
provided an opportunity for the governing majority to weaken its
militant anti-communist policy without making public conces-
sions to the BSP.
The "decommunization laws" put the MRF in an awkward
situation. The more involved the MRF became in
decommunization and retribution, the more open and threatening
BSP-supported nationalism became.
Party and affiliated organizations).
s' Narodno Subranie Reshenie za snemane na imunitet na naroden predstavitel,
Durzhaven Vestnik No. 57 (State Gazette) 3, 3 (Jul 14, 1992) (decision of the National
Assembly calling for the arrest of Andrei Lukanov).
' Trevoga za Bulgarckata demokratsiia, Duma 1, 1-2 (Jun 6, 1992) (memorandum of
BSP deputies); Svetlana Kructeva, Parlamentut raboti rezultatho i bez sotsialisti,
Demokratsiia 1, 1-2 (Jul 25, 1992).
" Konstitutsionen Sud, Reshenie No. 8 ot 27 iuli 1992 g. no konstitutsionio delo No. 7
ot 1992 g., Durzhaven Vestnik No. 64 (State Gazette) 3, 3-4 (Jul 31, 1992) (Constitutional
Court's decision on the banking law); Konstitutsionen Sud, Reshenie No. 9 ot 27 iuli 1992
g. no konstitutsionio delo No. 4 ot 1992 g., Durzhaven Vestnik No. 64 (State Gazette) 1, 1-
4 (Aug 7, 1992) (Constitutional Court's decision on the law confiscating the Communist
Party's property); Konstitutsionen Sud, Reshenie No. 11 ot 29 iuli 1992 g. no
konstitutsionio delo No. 18 ot 1992 g., Durzhaven Vestnik No. 64 (State Gazette) 4, 4-6
(Aug 7, 1992) (Constitutional Court's decision on the law amending the pension law).
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C. The Crisis of the Anti-communist Majority
The MRF behaved as a loyal partner in its coalition with the
UDF, supporting all legislative drafts of the UDF despite the fact
that the main concerns of UDF legislative policy adversely affect-
ed both the interests of the MRF electorate and the organization
itself. For example, the MRF supported the radical restitution of
landed property and the severe economic austerity program of
the UDF cabinet. 1 1 The economic measures gravely affected the
Turkish population because they were traditionally landless and
employed in heavily subsidized industries.0 2 The coinciding
jump in unemployment 3 and the liquidation of the socialist
cooperative farms caused an uncontrolled wave of Turkish emi-
gration, comparable to Turkish emigration in 1989. According to
December 1992 census figures, 120,000 Turks were reported to
have emigrated from Bulgaria during the previous year.0 4 Eco-
nomic reform, along with privatization and the introduction of a
market economy, did not facilitate the integration of the Turkish
minority. On the contrary, these policies enhanced the economic
divisions and contributed to the ethnic-religious unrest.
The UDF dominated the decision-making process in the
parliament and cabinet. Although occupying a key swing position
in the parliament, 5 the MRF never had the legitimacy of a
center-orientated party. Any references to the interests and pref-
erences of the MRF electorate could always be interpreted as eth-
nic separatism constituting a potential threat to national integri-
ty and sovereignty. In order to defend both the interests of its
electorate and its strategic position in the parliament, the MRF
had to find an impartial actor to represent its interests in the
parliament. This actor could legitimize the MRF's use of its
swing position in the parliament and the MRF's attempts to
begin bargaining with the BSP, which also opposed the radical
101 Krasimir Kunev, Natsionalnoetnicheskite problemi i formiraneto na politicheskiia
spectur v Bulgariia in 1 Seminar Aspekti na etnokulturnata situatsiia v Bulgariia i na
Balkanite 96, 100 (Izdava se ot Tsentura za izsledvane na demokratsiiata i fondatsiia
"Fridrikh Nauman", 1992).
102 Id.
" In some areas with ethnically mixed populations, unemployment has reached 40
percent or even 50 percent. In some villages, unemployment is 90 percent. Minority
Enemployment Goes Up, BTA Daily News External News Service 4, 4 (Jul 30, 1992).
" Filipov and Tsvetarski, Vunshnata migratsiia at 11-16 (cited in note 14); National
Statistical Institute, Vutreshna i vunshna migratsiia at 28-34 (cited in note 28).
10 The other two parties in the parliament, the UDF and the BSP, were irreconcilably
divided and could never form a coalition cabinet.
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economic reform. The only political authority conceived by the
general public as an impartial political actor was the Presi-
dent.'16 With the active support of the President, MRF deputies
publicly opposed the radical economic policy of the UDF and
asked for personnel changes in the cabinet.' The UDF refused
to make any concessions, preferring parliamentary crisis and new
general elections to changes in cabinet policy.'l8 In response,
the MRF withdrew its support for the UDF cabinet, causing a
governmental crisis.' 9
This crisis lasted two months, during which time neither the
UDF nor the BSP could confirm a cabinet without the support of
the MRF. The MRF was the third and the last party to propose a
prime-minister-designate in an attempt to form a cabinet."0 Ac-
cording to the Constitution, if that attempt failed the parliament
was to be dissolved and pre-term general elections were to be
held. The MRF nominated Professor Lyuben Berov, a prominent
intellectual and influential presidential advisor on economic poli-
cy, as the prime-minister-designate."' The proposed cabinet in-
cluded experts, who were not affiliated with any political party,
and only one MRF representative, who was an ethnic Bulgarian.
The BSP had to choose between possible further
marginalization through the restoration of the non-cooperative,
anti-communist parliamentary majority by pre-term elections, or
supporting the MRF candidate for Prime Minister thus causing a
split in that majority. The ex-communist party chose the latter,
legitimizing the role of the MRF as a moderator in the parlia-
ment, and recognizing the Turkish minority party as an impar-
tial political partner."' In exchange, the BSP declared its ex-
pectations of MRF support for a softening of the
decommunization policy."
'" According to the Constitution, the President is the Head of the State who repre-
sents the whole nation because he is elected in a nationwide vote. Bulg Const, Arts 92
and 93.
' Ahmed Dogan on Government, BTA Daily News 3, 3 (Jul 28, 1992); Dogan Votes No
Confidence in the Government, BTA Daily News 6, 6 (Jul 25, 1992).
1" SDS Says Early Elections Are Being 'Forced' on It, BTA Daily News 4, 4 (Nov 24,
1992).
"' Parliament Votes No Confidence in the Cabinet, Filip Dimitrov Resigns, BTA Daily
News 3, 3 (Oct 28, 1992).
. SDS-DPS Consultations Continue, BTA Daily News 8, 8 (Dec 17, 1992); DPS
Rejects SDS Candidate, BTA Daily News 7, 7 (Dec 21, 1992).
. DPS Picks Economist Lyuben Berov for P.M., BTA Daily News 5, 5 (Dec 22, 1992).
112 New Prime Minister Elected, BTA Daily News 5, 5 (Dec 22, 1992); Who's Who in the
New Bulgarian Cabinet, Cabinet Crisis Ends, BTA Daily News 6, 6-7 (Dec 22, 1992).
" Before the cabinet was elected, the majority of the BSP and the MRF revoked the
50 The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable
Put in the position of an oppositional parliamentary minori-
ty, the UDF opted again for the democratic recalcitrance strate-
gy, calling for pre-term general elections. All subsequent at-
tempts of the MRF and a splinter group of UDF deputies to form
shifting majorities in the parliament have proven virtually im-
possible." 4
CONCLUSION
Liberalization was an unavoidably long stage in the Bulgari-
an transition to democracy. Its outcome was mainly predeter-
mined by the stability of the communist regime, the lack of active
dissidents, and the relatively mild government repressions. After
the first free elections, the ex-communist party redefined and/or
reproduced its legitimacy and consequently retained the potential
to dominate the political process.
The policy of the BSP towards the MRF never included intro-
ducing universal standards, mutual concessions, or self-restraint
through bargaining because it became clear that such strategies
would substantially erode the electoral support for the BSP. The
strategy of the ex-communist party, reformist elite was to pre-
serve the deprived position of the Turkish minority, not through
direct interference into ethnic-religious community life, but by
conditioning their political freedoms through gag rules and judi-
cial review. Dominating the constitution-making process, the BSP
"privatized" the issue of ethnic-religious minorities rights, assur-
ing through constitutional provisions the further institutionaliza-
tion of the gag rule's strategy. The MRF, after becoming part of
the governing parliamentary majority, also agreed to follow this
strategy, as it proved to be the most rational way of resolving
ethnic-religious conflicts in Bulgarian society.
The policy of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, the incumbent
party elite, was aimed at preemptive political and economic
changes that would guarantee a gradual transition towards liber-
warrant for arrest of Andrei Lukanov, former Prime Minister of the transitional BSP cabi-
nets. The act was a symbolic one, as, according to the law, Lukanov was to be released in
ten days, on January 8, 1993. Narodno Subranie Reshenie za chastichna otmiana na
Reshenieto za snemane na imunitet na naroden predstavitel ot 7 iuli 1992 g., Durzhaven
Vestnik No. 105 (State Gazette) 2, 2 (Dec 31, 1992) (National Assembly's decision to free
Lukanov).
114 Currently, 32 of the 110 UDF deputies support the cabinet of Berov. Filip
Dimitrov's Nomination Defeated in the Parliament, BTA Daily News 4, 4-5 (Nov 20, 1992);
Coalition Cabinet or Elections to Become Known Soon, BTA Daily News 4, 4 (Dec 14,
1992).
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al democracy and market economy. By using the strategy of gag
rules, they tried to promote what Nietzsche called aktive
Vergesslichkeit (literally, "active forgetfulness")."5 By closing
the books on the past and keeping retribution for former crimes
off the political agenda, the BSP tried to secure the compliance of
the T-DF and the other oppositional parties."6 This strategy
was delegitimized and thus became unproductive for two reasons:
first, the aktive Vergesslichkeit formula of the ex-communist par-
ty, the BSP, was viewed as imposed on rather then accepted by
the opposition because the BSP held a majority in parliament;
second, the BSP refused to answer to the appeals of the opposi-
tion, backed by the general public, for active penance. As a re-
sult, gag rules only strengthened the pro-communist/anti-commu-
nist cleavage in Bulgarian society, making it dominant at least
until the next general elections.
In post-communist societies, majorities are usually formed
along irreconcilable conflicts and established divisions. The politi-
cal changes in Bulgaria have led to a peculiar cross-sectioning of
two major divisions-ethnic/religious and pro-communist/anti-
communist. It is unclear whether the swing position of the eth-
nic-religious minority party is a mere coincidence or a quite pre-
dictable, if unintended, consequence of the cautious, rational and
non-cooperative policy of the two dominant political actors. In
either case, this is the only formula that has shown relatively
good prospects for the democratization process in Bulgaria.
1 See Holmes, Gag Rules at 27 (cited in note 3).
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